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Fish: Holocaust Denial and Academic Freedom

Seegers Lecture
HOLOCAUST DENIAL AND ACADEMIC
FREEDOM
Stanley Fish
I.
On April 11, 2000, in a London courtroom, Judge Charles Gray
declared in favor of defendant Deborah Lipstadt, author of Denying the
Holocaust, and against David Irving, a freelance historian who had sued
Lipstadt and her publisher, Penguin Books, for libel on the basis of her
characterization of him as a Holocaust denier and a manipulator and
distorter of historical evidence. Irving charged that Lipstadt's statements
impugned his credentials as a historian and brought him into
professional disrepute. Lipstadt and Penguin Books replied by asserting
the truth of what had been published, and after massive expert
testimony in support of their claim was presented, Judge Gray agreed,
and ruled (among other things) that Irving would have to pay the costs
of the defense, some two million pounds.
To date, the trial has been the subject of two books, a number of
essays, and innumerable reports in newspapers and magazines. What is
remarkable about these materials is the degree to which the issue is seen
not as the accuracy of a particular historical account, but the honor of
history itself and even the honor of Truth. Such rhetorical overkill has
been a feature of discussions of Holocaust denial ever since the
phenomenon became a matter of public comment. The subtitle of
Lipstadt's book is The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory. In Michael
Shermer's and Alex Grobman's Denying History, the concerns of
Lipstadt's subtitle are raised to the position of the main title. A recent
piece in the New Yorker Magazine ends with the portentous statement that
"Irving's only victim was the truth."' In an essay published in The
Atlantic Monthly, D.D. Guttenplan spends a final paragraph celebrating
"the sanctity of facts." 2 In the eyes of these authors, Irving is a
perpetrator of crimes against epistemology. Irving must be answered
not so that a factual dispute can be resolved, but so that the very idea of
fact can be protected from a deconstructive subversion. This line of
I Ian Buruma, Blood Libel, NEW YORKER MAGAZINE, April 16, 2001, at 86.
2

D.D. Guttenplan, The Holocaust on Trial, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 2000, at 66.
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argument is, I believe, an error, both philosophical and tactical, and in
what follows I will try to say why.
Let me begin by affirming some basic propositions. First, the
Holocaust certainly did occur, and I say this not as an expression of
opinion, but as a matter of fact about which I have no doubt. Second,
Deborah Lipstadt is persuasive when, in Denying The Holocaust,3 she
links Holocaust denial to the traditional tropes of anti-semitism and
locates the phenomenon on the radical right and the lunatic left where it
makes company with various forms of racism and fascist ideology.
Third, Professor Lipstadt is correct in her refusal to debate Holocaust
deniers and in the reason she gives for that refusal: to debate would be
to confer legitimacy on a vicious and evil argument by granting it the
status of "the other side" in a controversy supposedly not yet settled by
conclusive evidence. Fourth, Professor Lipstadt is also correct when she
takes Holocaust denial seriously despite the relatively small number of
those engaged in it; for, as she sees, while few may be actively promoting
the gospel of denial, modem forms of communication make it possible
for the words of a few to make an impression on multitudes, especially if
they appear (however negatively labeled) in respectable venues like ABC
News and the New York Times or are given representation on panels
and conferences convened by universities and professional associations.
Now for the dropping of the other shoe. Although I admire
Lipstadt's work and believe that on most substantive points she is right, I
believe too that she is wrong about why she is right. She is wrong, that
is, to rest her case for what is right (and true) on distinctions like those
between "irrefutable evidence" 4 and myth, rationality and bigotrys,
"reasoned dialogue and anti-intellectual pseudo-scientific arguments" 6
"reasonable inquiry" and "ideological extremism," 7 genuine arguments
and ad-hominem arguments. 8 The trouble with these distinctions is that
they do their work-the work of marking off the legitimate from the
illegitimate-only when the content of those categories has been specified
in advance, that is, when you already know (at least to your satisfaction)
what is legitimate and what is not. Lipstadt knows before she even
encounters it that any argument denying or diminishing the Holocaust is

See generally, DEBORAH UPSTADT, DENYING
Id. at 21.
5 Id. at

18.
Id.
at
25.
7
1d.
11Id.
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specious and that the so called evidence it invokes is not really evidence
at all but strained rationalization and downright fabrication; that is why
she dismisses Holocaust denial as "the apotheosis of irrationalism." 9
And on the other side, her opponents know that any evidence
supposedly supporting the myth of the Holocaust proceeds from the
vast and well funded machinery of a Zionist conspiracy, and that in
truth, in the words of Mark Weber, the myth's "underpinnings in the
world of historical fact are non-existent-no Hitler order, no plan, no
budget, no gas chambers, no autopsies of gassed victims, no bones, no
ashes, no skulls, no nothing." 1 Neither party reaches its conclusion by
sifting the evidence on the way to determining the truth of the matter;
rather, each begins with a firm conviction of what the truth of the matter'
is, and then from inside the lens of that conviction receives and evaluates
(the shape of the evaluation is assured) the assertion of contrary truths.
In saying this I am not faulting either party, at least not on this score. As
Augustine long ago taught us (in On Christian Doctrine)", no sequence of
reasoning can even get started without the anchoring presence of some
substantive proposition it did not generate. That proposition may or
may not be true, but its truth will be neither confirmed nor disconfirmed
by the ratiocinative process it grounds and directs. True belief does not
emerge from reason's chain; rather true belief-and false belief tooconfigure reason's chain and determine in advance what will be seen as
reasonable and what will be recognized as evidence. Lipstadt is wrong
to assert that "evidence plays no role for deniers"' 2 or that deniers
"repudiate reasoned discussion" 13. Deniers' pages are no less full of
evidence and reasoning than are her pages; it is just that what is evidence
for them is absurdity for her and what is evidence for her is Zionist
blindness for them. This does not mean that there is nothing to choose
between them-I have already declared my choice and in unequivocal
terms--but that the choice cannot be made on the basis of who uses
evidence and who doesn't (that's just a version of name calling.)
How then does one choose? The question is misleading because
it pictures choosing as an action performed by an intelligence abstracted
or distanced from partisan affiliations, ethnic and religious background,
educational history, and so on; some one who, in Jurgen Habermas'

9LIPSTADT, supranote 3, at 20.
10 Mark

Weber, Newsletter of the Institute for Historical Review (1998)

11 ST. AUGUSTNE, ON CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE BOOK I, XXX-XXXIV 397 (D.W. Robinson,

trans., Bobbs-Merrill ed., 1958).
12LIPSTADT, supra note 3, at 21.

13 Id.at 20.
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phrase, assents to nothing but the "better argument." 14 But there is no
better argument in the sense Habermas intends, no argument whose
"betterness" will impress itself on any person not in the grasp of some
ideological obsession, no argument so little beholden to the variety of
circumstances and assumptions that its rightness is self-evident. This is
not to say that there are no better arguments, only that they emerge and
are registered as better against the background of other arguments
already identified as better, arguments long since accepted and now
firmly in place as cornerstones in the sedimented structure of a mind
whose categories and rubrics organize the world, not after perception
but in the act of perception. I did not decide one day that the Holocaust
did happen and was an undoubted fact. I grew up in a culture (postwar, American and Jewish) where the Holocaust (then not named) was a
given, with relatives who had survived it, and a father who spent time
and money bringing those relatives to the United States. It would no
more have occurred to me to question either the fact or the enormity of
the event than it would have occurred to me to question the fact that I
was a resident of Providence, Rhode Island or that Ted Williams was the
greatest living baseball player if not the greatest living American. As a
result when I first heard about the phenomenon of Holocaust denial, I
heard it as an obvious absurdity, as an outlandish thesis that had
attached to it a burden of proof requirement so strong that nothing was
likely to satisfy it.
That's the way it is with evidence; it doesn't just sit there
unadorned and unencumbered asking for your independent evaluation;
it sits in the midst of a structure (of belief and conviction) that precedes it
and colors ones reception of it. Consider another, less culturally fraught,
example. I make my honest living as a Miltonist, someone who teaches
and writes about the poetry and prose of John Milton. Like the majority
of Miltonists of the past one hundred and fifty years (pretty much the
entire history of Milton studies), I move back and forth between the
poetry and the polemic prose, reading one in the light of the other, and,
again like the vast majority of my fellow Miltonists, I rely especially on
Milton's massive theological treatise De Doctrina Christiana, Christian
5
Doctrine.1
A few years ago, William Hunter of the University of
Houston, a distinguished Miltonist, published an essay and eventually a
book asserting that ChristianDoctrine was not written by Milton. I shall
not here rehearse his arguments, which are well reasoned and supported
14

JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FAcTS AND NORMS 35-36, 170 (1996).
is John Milton, The Christian Doctrine, in 17 THE WORKS OF JOHN MILTON (F.A. Patterson et

al. eds., 1934).
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by evidence in the usual literary-historical ways. I shall only report that
those revisionist arguments have been rejected by most Miltonists and
that the evidence adduced for them has been found unpersuasive. Now
a cynic might say that this outcome only indicates the extent to which
workers in a field will find a way to dismiss a thesis which, if it were
accepted, would necessitate a re-evaluation and a downgrading of
everything they had accomplished in the course of their careers; and it is
certainly the case that the Milton who is presented in the books and
essays written by members of the Milton Society of America (and we are
all members) is a Milton whose beliefs and doctrinal affiliations are
generally congruent with those found in Christian Doctrine. But this
same observation might be made in a more generous (and accurate)
spirit: insofar as there is a public entity called "John Milton", he is the
product of the labors of men and women working within certain shared
assumptions, including the assumption that he is the author of Christian
Doctrine (an assumption they no more decided to believe in than I
decided to believe in the factuality of the Holocaust). In effect these men
and women were now being asked to assent to the proposition that the
John Milton they intimately and confidently knew wasn't John Milton
but someone else, a someone else whose life and works they would have
to start constructing all over again. Of course they imposed a very
severe burden of proof requirement and it is neither surprising nor the
occasion for cynicism that in their judgment the requirement wasn't met.
Could William Hunter be right and the majority of Miltonists be
wrong? Sure, there is always that possibility, not simply about this
matter of dispute, but about any matter. But the fact that Hunter might
turn out to be right in the long run is not a reason for withdrawing from
our present conviction that he is wrong or for declaring the question to
be in doubt because on some future day when more evidence is
produced we might change our minds. Intellectual responsibility does
not require us to be absolutely certain of the truths we affirm beyond the
possibility of their ever being refuted (that requirement would make the
assertion of truth impossible, for it could never be met) only to be certain
that the truths we affirm square with the evidence provided by our best
lights (which will not be everyone's best lights). As Judith Jarvis
Thompson explains, when someone proposes a counterintuitive thesis
(the Holocaust didn't happen; Milton didn't write Milton's Christian
Doctrine), the burden of proof is his and "requires his producing what we
-given our past experience-can see to be reason to revise our beliefs.
For what is in question is whether we [a particular, situated we] would
be acting responsibly in refusing to reverse ourselves-not whether an
all knowing God would, but whether we would." That is why,
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2001
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Thompson concludes, "our acting responsibly in refusing to reverse
ourselves is entirely compatible with our being mistaken" in the long
16

run.

What this means is that Lipstadt needn't make the strong claims
that all the evidence is on her side, that her evidence is "irrefutable" 17,
that Holocaust deniers have no evidence, and have forsaken deliberative
reason for ideology. But I would make the point more strongly: she
shouldn't make those claims because they (implicitly) set the bar of
validation too high and open up a space in which the deniers can play
games they wouldn't have been able to play had the bar been set lower.
Let me explain. If the standard of validation is the establishment of a
truth that is invulnerable to challenge, no one, including Lipstadt, could
meet it; and, moreover, in the gap between that unrealizable standard of
proof and what can be proven according to standards less severe, there is
room for all the little maneuvers deniers so skillfully employ-insisting
that all points of view, and especially theirs, should have a fair hearing
and not be discounted until they have been proven to be absolutely false
(no such proof will ever be available); raising questions (about autopsies,
budgets, master plans, precise numbers, etc) that cannot be definitively
answered, and arguing that until they are answered the issue must
remain open; invoking First Amendment considerations generally and
Academic Freedom in particular as warrants for fully entertaining every
proposed doubt lest the Marketplace of Ideas be shut down prematurely
(in the knowledge that a strong First Amendment position mandates that
the Marketplace of Ideas never be shut down).
These maneuvers are effective in part because they seem
answerable to the criteria favored by Lipstadt and others -objectivity,
disinterestedness, neutrality. Behind these words, as Lawrence Douglas
has observed, is the demand that the past be approached "from a
position of formal agnosticism,"18 that is, from a position in which no
belief is yet warranted and all matters wait to be proven by the
independent processes of critical reason. This is, as Douglas goes on to
say, "a weak position from which to defend the integrity of the historical
record," 19 because by suspending positive belief and putting everything

16 Judith Jarvis Thompson, Ideology and Faculty Selection, LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 1990, at 155, 160-161.
17LIPSTADTr, supra note 3, at 21.
I8 Lawrence Douglas, Policing the Past: Holocaust Denial and the Law, in CENSORSHIP AND
SILENCING 67, 82 (Robert C. Post ed., 1998).
19Id.
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indifferently up for grabs, the historical record is rendered the play-thing
of the infinite and infinitely contested assertions that can be made about
it. When nothing is granted even a provisional certainty-when every
fact must be tested down to its (non-available) ground-the category of
the "taken-for-granted" or "what everyone knows to be true" loses its
members, and no one can rely on truths commonly held or refute
obvious falsehoods by simply declaring them to be such. The irony, as
Douglas points out, is that the "evidentiary agnosticism"20 or "discursive
neutrality" 21 supposedly devised to safeguard truth and fact from the
incursions of ideology, have instead "the effect of contributing to the
erosion of the very boundary between truth and fiction" 22 it claims to
police. This is a result usually attributed, mistakenly, to the arguments
of postmodernism; but it is the arguments of liberal neutrality and
objectivity that produce it and by producing it keep alive the Holocaust
revisionism they are brought in to combat.
What then does one do in order to combat the virus of Holocaust
denial? The answer to the question is contained in the ThompsonDouglas critique of evidentiary agnosticism and discursive neutrality.
Don't flee the historical record in the name of empty and manipulable
abstractions. Resist appeals to fairness, process, free speech, academic
freedom, or any other "principle" invoked in order to lend a veneer of
legitimacy to arguments that would otherwise not be taken seriously.
(These resonant words and phrases have done honorable work in the
past, but in the present case they are being wielded as weapons and
anyone who rises to their bait is saying "hit me again" and playing the
game on the enemy's terms.) Insist that truths generally acknowledged
enjoy an earned privileged position and that anyone who seeks to
dislodge them must jump over a formidable succession of hurdles; the
playing field is not level and shouldn't be. Rely without apology on the
ordinary, tried and true, sources of authority- government agencies,
official commissions of inquiry, standard works of scholarship, and the
received wisdom of professional bodies and associations.
Thompson provides a model when she imagines the response a
college committee charged with recommending a disciplinary home for
an open chair might make to the suggestion that the chair be devoted to
astrology. Presumably, she conjectures, the committee will vote the
suggestion down, but then a "friend of astrology requests a hearing.., at

0Id. at 81.

2Id. at 83.
2 Id. at 81.
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which he says, 'New ideas...AAUP...germination space...defenders of
orthodoxy. ' "23 "What," she asks," do we reply?" Well, we might say
that "astrology does not meet even the minimal standard and enterprise
must meet if it is to count as a science." 24 But, as she points out, "the
friend of astrology is not without a reply." He might, for example say
"'Prove it!,'" that is, prove that there is no relationship between the stars
and the course of earthly events despite Shakespeare's apparent belief in
stellar influence, the many civilizations in which astrological predictions
have been and are still today accorded great authority, the millions of
readers of professional astrologers compensated very handsomely by
some of our leading newspapers .But, as Thompson sees, this is a trap;
for it is a demand for a proof arrived at by setting aside (as biased,
parochial, self-interested, tied to the status quo) the authorities and
traditions of inquiry that led the college committee to reject the
candidacy of astrology immediately, and beginning again from the
ground up, from scratch. This, however, is not the way we make
judgements or could possibly make judgments; for the very intelligibility
of a scene of judgment depends on a background of prior judgments
already made and taken for granted. It is only against such a
background that alternative courses of actions are perspicuous and
available for consideration; take the background away, and you are
indeed back at ground zero with no resources to guide you and no
defense at all against those willful polemicists who would substitute
their history for the history you have unwisely surrendered. The request
that we begin again from a position of neutrality and suspicion of
currently prevailing views seems to breathe the spirit of critical reason,
but in fact it is a device designed to afford conspiracy theorists a blank
page on which to inscribe their fantasies.
Thompson is eloquent both on the false challenge of "Prove it"
and the appropriate way of dealing with it:
To begin with, could we prove that astrology fails to
meet the minimal standard, and is therefore not a
science? Perhaps you could, but I can't. I can't even do
much in the way of formulating an argument. I believe
that the motions of the heavenly bodies do not influence
the everyday affairs of ordinary people, but on what
ground do I believe this? My believing is a product of a
vague, loose conception of how the world works and of
Thompson, supra note 14, at 158.
24Id. at 159.
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what causality involves and requires, picked up over the
years from experience (which includes some snippets of
science I have become acquainted with), and there is
nothing I can produce in the way of compact, clear
argument for my belief. Perhaps one of my colleagues
in our physics department could do better than I
can...but I say only perhaps, because demonstrating that
the motions of the heavenly bodies do not influence the
everyday affairs of ordinary people is not a task that the
average physicist has ever thought of carrying out, and
it is not obvious how he or she is to do so.
Does that mean that I acted improperly in
voting against astrology? I should think not To
suppose it does is surely to indulge in excessive highmindedness about what responsible decision-making
requires. Since my belief really did issue from a
conception of how the world works, acquired from past
experience, I need not be capable of proving that there is
no future in astrology in order to have acted responsibly
in rejecting it.
Indeed, it would have been irresponsible for me
to have acted otherwise... As a member of the
committee, I was under a duty precisely to bring my
past experience to bear on, among other questions, the
question what fields are worth investing in. Given my
past experience, I would have failed in that duty if I had
refrained from voting against astrology. 25
This is so good and so clear that it needs no gloss and allows us easily to
transform the example, as Thompson later does, to one in which a
Holocaust denier applies for a position in your History department.
What you do is stand on your past experience, which includes the
collective experience of the historical profession, mark the distance
between what it tells you with all of the authority of many previous
scholarly findings and what the denier now tells you, and reject the
petition without engaging in any deep philosophical discussions
("excessive high mindedness") of what is and is not a fact, and of
whether or not facts are socially constructed, and of whether the book of
inquiry can ever be closed-all real questions to be sure, but not to the
2 Id. at 159-60.
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point here where you are making an institutional decision. Always
remember, Thompson admonishes, that the denier must justify his
candidacy "to us," not to some imagined committee of meta-historians or
philosophers of language: "it is in light of our past experience with and
in history that we must assess his competence for the position... And we
have a principled defense of our assessment just to the extent that we
have exercised due care [again a professional standard , not a
philosophical one] in arriving at it." 26
I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge that some of the
opponents of Holocaust denial are already acting as Thompson advises
them to do, but unfortunately they often weaken their stance by
embroidering it with a rhetoric that leaves them vulnerable to the
counter-strategies of their enemies. Consider, for example, an oft-cited
declaration of principle produced by the Duke University History
department in the wake of Bradley Smith's successful attempt to place a
Holocaust denial ad in the student newspaper. The History department
in its collective and unanimous wisdom said:
That historians are constantly engaged in historical
revision is certainly correct; however, what historians do
is very different from this advertisement. Historical
revision of major events.., is not concerned with the
actuality of these events; rather, it concerns their
historical interpretation-their causes and consequences
generally. There is no debate among historians about
the actuality of the Holocaust.
This statement has a good part and a bad part. In the bad part the
members of the department try to separate themselves from deniers by
distinguishing between the uncovering of fact (what they do) and
subsequent acts of interpretation (what the other guys do), a distinction
also declared by Lipstadt: "The historian does not create, the historian
uncovers. The validity of a historical interpretation is determined by
how well it accounts for the facts."27 But the distinction works only if the
historical facts are self-declaring, self-evident, just waiting to be
uncovered by the first researcher with unbiased eyes (whatever they
would be); then it would make sense to imagine (as Lipstadt does) rival
interpreters setting their interpretations next to the facts in anticipation

2Id. at 171.
SLiPSTADT, supra note 3, at 25.
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of the judgment they will then render, as in "this account of us is pretty
good, but this other is way off the mark." Michael Shermer and Alex
Grobman imagine a similar scenario when they define the work of the
historian as "the combined product of past events and the discovery and
description of past events. "28 According to this language, events exert a
pressure on their own discovery and co-operate, in a way that remains
unspecified, with the task of describing themselves. But when lively
disputes break out they are typically (and most interestingly) disputes
about what the facts and the past events are and not about what they
mean (although that is certainly -another order of historical debate).
Indeed if the facts and past events spoke for themselves, even in the
minimal sense of specifying the general outlines of their interpretation,
there would be very little, if anything, for historians to do, and it would
be hard to account for the extraordinary passion of disputes about fact,
unless one party simply declared that the other was crazy, mendacious,
and evil, which is of course what happens all the time.
On the day (August 7,2000) that I write this, the New York Post
carries a two page story detailing the failure of the United States to
intervene on behalf of Polish and Italian Jews when it would have been
possible to do so. Just yesterday (August 6), the New York Times Sunday
Book Review devoted a full page to a new book arguing that The United
States did what it could do and should have done, and is in no way to be
faulted. 29 This is a matter of disputed fact--what did the U.S. do and
when did they do it if they did it and could they have done more?-not of
interpretation, although the interpretations will certainly follow once the
main facts are settled (if they are settled) to the satisfaction of all the
debating parties (a satisfaction that could always be upset by later
revelations, but so what?). The moral is clear. Those fighting against
Holocaust deniers are in the same business as their enemy, not in some
cleaner, less interpretive, less interested business; what separates them
are not their epistemologies, but their beliefs and conclusions. The
answer to the question in Shermer's and Grobman's subtitle-why do
Holocaust deniers say it?-is that they believe it, which is also the reason
Holocaust affirmers say what they say; they believe it. But, comes the
objection, Holocaust affirmers say what they say because they have
evidence for it, to which I give the reply I have already given: everyone
has evidence; the problem is that one man's evidence is another man's

2 MICHAEL SHERMER & ALEX GROBMAN, DENYING HISTORY: WHO SAYS THE HOLOCAUST
NEVER HAPPENED AND WHY Do THEY SAY IT? 21 (2000).

Omer Bartov, A Tale of Two Holocausts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2000 § 7 (Book Review Desk),
at 8. (reviewing NORMAN G. FINKELSTEIN, THE HOLOCAUST INDUSTRY (2000)).
2
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rationalization or fabrication, and in the absence of a category of
evidence labeled "undisputed by no one" or "unavailable to challenge",
the marshaling of evidence will not settle disputes, but fuel them.
Shermer and Grobman pose the right question when they ask
"We all write our own ideological scripts, so what is the difference
between our scripts and the scripts of extremists," although the answer
they seek is unavailable? 30 What they are looking for is a difference
more generally and abstract than the difference between those scripts
that persuade us and those that don't, but there is no such difference. If I
am persuaded that Deborah Lipstadt is right and David Irving is wrong,
it is not because she has a better theoretical account of evidence and fact
than he does (as I have already said, her account of these matters is to
my mind naive and incoherent), but because the archives she consults,
the authorities she cites, the lines of reasoning she pursues, the
corroboration she can claim from others in the field, all ring more true to
me than the parallel authorities, archives, lines of reasoning and citations
to colleagues proffered by Irving. This is the way historians achieve
credibility -by telling a story that fits with the stories we already know
to be true and telling it in ways that correspond to our by now intuitive
and internalized sense of how one connects the dots between
observations on the way to a conclusion. Historians do not gain
credibility (or anything else) by becoming meta-historians, that is by
giving big answers to large questions like, What is the nature of fact?,
How does one determine what counts as evidence?, Can the past be
reconstructed?, Can the distinction between the past and the present be
maintained? Whatever answers you give to such questions will be
entirely unhelpful and beside the point when you return from their airy
heights to the questions historians appropriately ask. If I say it is a
documented fact that such and such a number of persons died in gas
chambers, and you say, but facts are disputable, the evidence is not all in,
the past is always a construction of present desires, or some such, then I
should respond, all that may be true, but so what? You don't dispute
anything by declaring that it could be disputed; and the fact that the
evidence is not all in merely means that time has not yet run its course,
and that meanwhile we live (as John Donne said) in Time's parentheses
where we much do our work and reach our conclusions. The fact that
others, perhaps equally credentialed, reach opposite conclusions and
cling to them even in the fact of our evidence is unfortunate (from our
point of view), but no remedy will be found in some general

30 SHERMER AND GROBMAN, supra note 28, at 91.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol35/iss3/2

Fish: Holocaust Denial and Academic Freedom

20011

HOLOCAUST DENIAL

epistemological account in the light of which one set of conclusions will
be validated and the other not. I may believe that I am absolutely right
about the reality of the Holocaust and about Milton's authorship of the
ChristianDoctrine, but my conviction that my arguments and conclusions
are superior to those of my opponent will never be shored up by the
judgment of some independent epistemological machine. In so far as
such a machine has been constructed, it will either be so general that
there is no way to get from its operations to the questions we want to
answer, or if you can get from the machine to an answer it is because the
answer-partisan and stipulated in advance-has been built in. What
this means is that evidentiary procedures rather than standing above or
to the side of polemical arguments are part and parcel of those
arguments, 'which means that, epistemologically speaking (an ugly
phrase), our scripts and the scripts of extremists are the same; or rather,
with a nod to Baudelaire, we are all brother extremists, just for different
faiths.
Does this mean that Holocaust affirmers are without recourse in
their efforts to discredit, and by discrediting silence, Holocaust deniers?
Not at all. It just means that no help will be found in metacritical
accounts of history or theories of fact and evidence, for as I have already
said twice now, everybody has those. Where then is the difference that
can be seized and provide the basis for victory? The answer lies in a fact
everywhere noted, but whose strategic and practical implications have
been too little grasped: the vast majority of mainstream researchers
support Holocaust affirmers and reject Holocaust deniers. In an
important sense, the battle has already been won, but the victors fail to
see it because they want victory on terms-philosophical/epistemological
terms-that will never yield it. They dissipate their huge advantage
when they insist on buttressing it with uncashable theoretical claims.
My advice is simple and easy to follow: forget the theory, forget the
epistemology, forget the meta-history -they are the preferred games of
the opponent-and just go with the privileged position you already enjoy
by belonging to a pre-eminent and powerful guild.
That's the good part of the Duke History Department statement,
the declaration that "There is no debate among historians about the
actuality of the Holocaust." The declaration is circular, but in its
circularity lies its strength.
It is circular because the category
"historians" is understood implicitly as excluding, among other things,
people who deny the Holocaust. That is, in the eyes of the members of
the Duke History Department, you can't be a historian if you don't
accept the historical reality of the Holocaust, and since no one who
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doesn't hold the right view will ever be asked to join the Duke History
Department, you can be sure that this statement can and will be made ad
infinitum. Nor is this true of that department only. In 1991, the
American Historical Association declared firmly, "No serious historian
questions that the Holocaust took place". Here it is obvious that "serious
historian" means one who doesn't question the Holocaust, and it follows
(again in a circular fashion) that there will never be a serious historian
who questions the Holocaust because no such person will be let into the
historians' guild or invited into its debates. (But what if a recognized
serious historian already in the guild suddenly became converted to this
heresy? He or she probably wouldn't be excommunicated and certainly
not fired, but would instead be shunned, stigmatized, politely harassed
and encouraged in every way legal to exit the profession as soon as
possible.) At this point a scholarly Holocaust denier-a denier with
degrees and other academic qualifications-might complain, "but you're
not even giving me a chance; you're just deciding in advance that views
like mine will not be represented in your association and its
departments; you're just using the professional prestige of your
institutions to shut me out." And the response, if there is one, should be
"that's right; you're being shut out and you will never be let in as long as
we have anything to say about it, and it's a good thing too". But isn't
that a naked exercise of power? The answer is "no." Shutting Holocaust
deniers out would be a naked exercise of power if it were arbitrary, if
there were nothing behind it except the desire wholly to own the
franchise and prevent anyone else from claiming a part of it. But
standing behind the exclusion of deniers is the massive record of
rigorous research undertaken by superbly credentialed men and women
whose conclusions have met every reasonable test put to them. Those
who have contributed to this record need not be apologetic about
protecting it from the assaults of persons who would use the vocabulary
and machinery of intellectual inquiry to further ends that are rarely if
ever openly acknowledged, but known to everyone. When your
opponent is only pretending to play your game so that he can subvert it
and pervert it, you have every right-it is an earned right-to walk away
and refuse him the advantage of engagement.
By urging reliance on guild authority, I would seem to be
vulnerable to an objection that looks both backward and forward: if the
guild were corrupt, if at some future time -mainstream historians had
been persuaded to Holocaust denial, would I make the same argument,
or, alternatively, had I been a lawyer in Vichy France when the guild of
lawyers was in complicity with the Nazi occupation, would I have put
my faith in legal practice as it was constituted then?
This
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question/objection--posed pretty much in these terms by Richard
Weisberg at the Emory conference on Holocaust denial in November,
2000--harbors two assumptions I would challenge. First that I am
idealizing guild practice as such and identifying it as a trumping
authority, and, second, that the question of what I would have done in
the 1940's or would do in, say, 2025, is coherent and intelligible. But my
recommendation that Holocaust affirmers rest their case on what
mainstream researchers have produced in the way of evidence and
conclusions is strategic not normative. It is not a philosophical argument
for professional inerrancy, but a pragmatic argument that follows from
my contention that normative arguments provide Holocaust deniers
with opportunities to play their fancy theoretical games. All I'm saying
is, don't look there, in the world of normative abstractions, for support;
instead, look here, in the ready made world of professional practices and
judgments. But of course I say that within the conviction (not argued for
but just in place) that the guild of mainstream historians is not corrupt
and goes about its business with dedication and integrity (although to be
sure that there are probably some members of whom that could not be
said). My confidence in that guild in no way commits me to having
confidence in all other guilds nor does it commit me to retaining my
confidence in this guild should it fall into shoddy or venal practices.
Were that to happen I could easily see myself giving advice contrary to
the advice I have been giving so far and urging well-intentioned
historians to reject the practices of a guild I had judged unworthy.
But in order to make such a judgement, on the historians' guild
or any other, wouldn't I necessarily be invoking some perspective more
general and higher than the perspective of any particular guild or
context of practice, some normative or transcendent perspective? The
answer is no. I would be making the judgment from the perspective of
some other practice (political, moral, economic, domestic, whatever) in
which I was affirmatively engaged. The fact that no authority higher
than the authority provided by practices is available does not mean that
a practice can not be critiqued or rejected. It just means that it can not be
critiqued or rejected by some standard or measure that is itself not part
of some practice. But the unavailability of such a measure (the point to
which I keep returning) does not leave me (or you) without a basis for
judgment since there will always be practices that for contingent and
revisable reasons have my (or your) confidence and therefore it will
always be possible, and reasonable, for me (or you) to look out from
within such practices and render judgment on other practices.
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Having said that, I now turn to the question of what I would
have done in the past when conditions were different or might do in the
future when, again, conditions were different. Would I still make the
same arguments? This question is not and could not be a serious one.
The reason is that there is no sense in which the "I" to whom the
question is now put would be identical to the "I" imagined as living
either in the past or the future. That is, the question requires me to
project myself back or forward into circumstances other than the ones I
am in now, circumstances that would find "me" formed by experiences
(of education, upbringing, success, failure, career paths, etc.) other than
the experiences that have, in fact, been mine; and then, when everything,
including the categories of perception available to me, has been altered, I
am asked, what would "I"do? The obvious question to this question is,
who is this "I" you would have me answer for, and how am the "I"I am
now to know him? The arguments from either hindsight or foresight are
flawed in the same way; one asks what you have done then if you knew
what you know now, knew the outcomes your actions would produce
and were in possession of perspectives denied to the earlier "you"; the
other asks you, what would you do if present outcomes were undone
and everything were different. The answer in both cases is that if
everything were different, "you" would be different too, and therefore it
makes no sense to ask what a you that is not you would do. Challenges
like this seem to have force because of the (unannounced) assumption
that the "I" to whom they are put will always be the same, constituted by
the same unchanging priorities, in possession of the same reservoirs of
information, unaffected by its passage through history. But the fact of
historical change-"what if things were different?"--is what impels the
challenge, which comes unaccompanied by any explanation of why the
only thing that would not change is the first person subject. If
everything changes, persons change too, and the question of what "I"
would have done in a past "I" didn't experience or a future "I" cannot
know is a metaphysical conceit without any relevance to anything the
real "I" might do or urge now. So I assert again that right now I urge
those who would repel Holocaust deniers to trust in the conclusion
reached by innumerable historical researchers, and I assert too that I am
under no obligation to respond to hypotheticals that have a proper
home, if they have any home, in philosophy seminars.
II.
But what about academic freedom? The question will always be
asked, and it should be answered by distinguishing between two
conceptions of academic freedom, one tied to the "discursive neutrality"
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that constitutes, I believe, a trap for those who would beat back the
deniers, the other tied to a Thompson-like faith in long standing
disciplinary procedures and an implicit (although not absolute) trust in
the conclusions they have generated. The first conception of academic
freedom is the one most commonly invoked today. It is essentially
ahisorical, less focused on the political and institutional struggles in the
course of which academic freedom emerged as a rallying cry than on the
timeless ideals and values-the values in fact of Enlightenment
liberalism-of which academic freedom is said to be an instantiation.
Those values include the disinterested search for truth, the separation of
knowledge and power, the superiority of knowledge to belief, the
submission of all views to the scrutiny of critical deliberation, the
stigmatizing of no view in advance of its receiving a serious hearing, and
the exempting of no view from the requirement that it put itself to the
test of all challenges, including those that issue from sources its
proponents distrust. The idea is that the truth will out, or as Milton said
in his Aeropagitica, be victorious in a free and open encounter, and that
healthy and unfettered debate is its best safeguard. 31 Indeed, so strongly
did J.S. Mill believe in this vision that in On Liberty he advised that in the
absence of a challenge to a received opinion, one or more should be
invented so that the process of refining the truth be continued. 32 The
obstacle to achieving an accurate view of the truth, according to those
who follow in Mill's tradition, is the unfortunate affection we all have for
the ideas, authorities, and moral imperatives that have been transmitted
to us by culture, education, parental precept, religious affiliation, ethnic
identification and political persuasion. Such lenses are unavoidable for
partial beings, but their distorting effects can be neutralized, we are told,
by a strict adherence to neutral process. As Neil Hamilton explains in
his book Zealotry and Academic Freedom33:
This system [of the critical examination of everything] is
inherently anti-authoritarian. By imposing the obligation
to check opinions and to cultivate rather than curtail
criticism, it deprives intellectual, social, religious,
political, or ethnic authoritarians of all moral force. In
this system, the impulse to stamp out the offending or

See generally, JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH OF MR. JOHN MILTON FOR THE
LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING, TO THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND, LONDON, PRINTED IN
THE YEAR 1644 (A. S. Ash ed., 1998).
32See generally J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1978).
See generally NEIL HAMILTON, ZEALOTRY AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM (1998).
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insensitive opinion is an impulse to destroy knowledge
itself.m)

Underlying what Hamilton calls the "system" is a realist epistemology
that has been well described by John Searle who lists its basic tenets:
- "Reality exists independently of human representations".
- "Truth is a matter of the accuracy of representation."
- "A statement is true if and only if the statement corresponds to
the facts."
- "Knowledge is objective [and] does not depend on nor derive
from the subjective attitudes and feelings of particular
investigators.., the objective truth or falsity of the claims made is
totally independent of the motives, the morality, or even the
gender, the race, or the ethnicity of the maker."
- "Intellectual standards are not up for grabs. There are both
objectively and intersubjectively valid criteria of intellectual
achievement and excellence." s
Together with the value of sustained critical inquiry as celebrated by
Hamilton and derived from Mill, these tenets add up to a powerful case
for the obligation to take seriously every proposed viewpoint or thesis
no matter how outlandish or repugnant to received opinion. In the
words of historian Thomas Haskell, in a university that thinks of itself as
an extension of the Enlightenment project, "The price of participationin the
community of the competent is perpetual exposure to criticism,"36 and it would
seem that allowing Holocaust deniers into the critical conversation is
part of that price.
The challenge is clear: to come up with an argument that would
allow those who dismiss deniers without a hearing to claim that they are
upholding academic freedom, not violating it. In general there are two
strategies that might further this aim. The first is to contest both the
value of perpetual critical inquiry and the epistemology of which it is an

Id.at 161 (citations omitted).
John Searle, Rationalityand Realisin, What is at Stake?, in ACADEMIc FREEDOM AND TENURE:
201, 203-04, 206-07 (R.T. George ed., 1997).
3
Thomas L Haskell, Justifying the Rights of Academic Freedom in the Era of
"PowerKnowledge," in THE FUTURE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 43,47 (Louis Menand ed., 1996).
35
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extension. You might do this in several ways. You could argue that
when critical inquiry is elevated to the highest value it subordinates the
truth it supposedly serves in favor of its own processes. You could
argue that there is no such thing as a disinterested search for truth and
that if one began a search without interests already in place there would
be no reason to go in one direction rather than another or to go in any
direction at all. You could argue that knowledge is a function of belief
and that in the absence of belief-of some contestable notion of what the
world is and/or should be like-nothing would emerge for you as a fact
or a piece of knowledge. You could argue that the obligation to submit
all of ones views to the scrutiny of critique is incoherent, for that would
leave one without a center or focus from the vantage point of which a
scrutiny might be conducted. You could argue that while it is certainly
true that reality exists independently of human representations, human
representations are all we have and that while such representations are
indeed corrigible and revisable, they cannot be revised by juxtaposing
them to the reality of which they are the representations (if they could be
so revised you wouldn't need them; see the third book of Gulliver's
Travels37). You could argue that while truth is surely a matter of the

accuracy of representation, measures of representation are themselves
cultural and socially constructed and you always have to ask, "accuracy
as determined by what contextual and debatable models?" You could
argue that of course a statement is true if and only if the statement
corresponds to the facts, but that since the facts don't stand up and tell
you what they are, the correspondence is of representation to
representation and not of representation to (unrepresented) fact. You
could argue that while knowledge is objective, objectivity is itself a
standard relative to the in place norms and evidentiary rules of a
continually evolving discipline or practice. (As Richard Rorty once said,
"objectivity is the kind of thing we do around here"). You could argue
that while intellectual standards are not up for grabs in the sense that
you can't just declare new ones when the old ones thwart your purposes,
intellectual standards are nevertheless debatable, and debating them is a
large part of what goes on and is itself an activity presided over by
intellectual standards which are themselves in turn available to
challenge, a challenge that would itself be conducted according to
intellectual standards, which would themselves be challengeable, and on
and on and on.

.17See generally JONATHON SWIFT, GULLIVER's TRAVELs (1999).
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Now, I have myself made some of these arguments and would
be willing to do so again, if I thought it would be a good way to go. But
it is not, first of all because such arguments are hard to make in the
current intellectual climate (still configured by Enlightenment
liberalism), and therefore those who make them are always on the
defensive, which is exactly where deniers want them to be; but second,
and more important, there is a better argument available in the alternate
conception of academic freedom as a historical practice produced not by
the demand for philosophical coherence but by the urgently felt needs of
those engaged in a certain form of professional behavior. This kind of
academic freedom does not bother itself much with theories of truth, the
disinterested observer, the nature of representation and other
epistemological puzzles, but with a fairly simple question. What are the
conditions necessary for us to do our work as we conceive it and what
arrangements are most likely to secure those conditions?
It is in response to that kind of question that academic freedom
emerged as a central institutional value, most notably in the famous 1915
report on academic freedom and tenure issued by the American
Association of University Professors. In that document there is some
deference paid to the concept of unfettered critical inquiry, especially
when the authors declare that the university "should be an intellectual
experiment station, where new ideas may germinate and where their
fruit, though still distasteful to the community as a whole, may be
allowed to ripen until finally, perchance, it may become part of the
accepted intellectual food of the nation or of the world."38 Read in
isolation, this statement (itself somewhat ripe) would seem to argue for

allowing "new ideas" to flourish willy nilly until time and the
marketplace separated the wheat from the chaff. The sentence, however,
is preceded and followed by many others in which it becomes clear that
the freedom being recommended is institutionally defined and limited, is
not absolute freedom but "academic" freedom, in the sense both that it
is a freedom peculiar to the academic enterprise and a freedom whose
boundaries are to be determined and patrolled by academics. This last is
especially important because the report is produced in response to a
perceived threat to professional autonomy from outside forces, once
identified with various ecclesiastical establishments, now in 1915
identified with overweening boards of trustees. The enemy is described

American Association of University Professors, General Report of the Committee on
Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure (1915), LAW AND CONTEMP. PROKs. 393,400 (1990).
31
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by way of a quotation from an address delivered by Charles William
Eliot, President of Harvard:
These barbarous boards exercise an arbitrary power of
dismissal. They exclude from the teachings of the
university unpopular or dangerous subjects. In some
states they even treat professors' positions as common
political spoils; and all too frequently, both in state and
endowed institutions, they fail to treat the members of
the teaching staff with that high consideration to which
39
their functions entitle them.

What such boards do not understand is that "the responsibility of the
university teacher is primarily to the public itself, and to the judgment of
his own profession." 40 To be sure, boards of trustees in the course of
their duties are called upon to approve the appointment of teachers, but
once that authority has been exercised further supervision or
surveillance would be regarded as an unwarranted imposition: "the
relationship of professor to trustees may be compared to that between
judges of the Federal courts and the Executive who appoints them" and
"[Ulniversity teachers should be understood to be, with respect to the
conclusions reached and expressed by them, no more subject to the
control of the trustees, than are judges subject to the control of the
President, with respect to their decisions.... ."41 This does not mean that
university teachers are free to say or profess anything they like without
fear of reprisal or discipline. It is absolutely necessary that the
"incompetent" and the "unworthy" be purged from the professorial
ranks and prevented from using the freedom from external control "as a
shelter for inefficiency, for superficiality, or for uncritical and
intemperate partisanship"; 42 it is just that these acts of institutional
vigilance and good house-keeping should not be performed by "boards
of laymen," 43 but by fellow professionals: "It is ... inadmissible that the
power of determining when departures from the requirements of the
scientific spirit and method have occurred, should be vested in bodies
not composed of members of the academic profession." 44

" Id. at 395.
Id. at 397.
Id.
42 Id. at 402.
40

41

43 Id. at 401
4

American Association of University Professors, supra note 38, at 402.
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Three things seem clear: (1) for the authors of the 1915 statement,
academic freedom is limited and does not extend to those found
unworthy, incompetent, inefficient, superficial, and intemperate; (2) the
responsibility of determining who does or does not fall under these
negative rubrics belongs to fellow professionals who in exercising that
responsibility do not violate academic freedom but safeguard its
integrity; (3) failure to assume that responsibility will lead to the erosion
of academic freedom, for if members of the profession decline the task of
making hard judgements, "it is certain that the task will be performed by
others-by others who lack certain essential qualifications for

performing it..

....

45

From these three follow a fourth, which is exactly to

our point: there is plenty of room in the concept of academic freedom as
defined by the 1915 report to determine that Holocaust denial is, in and
of itself, a "departure from the requirements of the scientific spirit and
method" and an instance of "intemperate partisanship." I am not saying
that such a determination is inevitable or automatic, but that if it is made
as a result of due consideration by responsible bodies like the Duke
University History Department or the American Historical Association
there is no reason-and certainly no reason labeled "academic freedom"to leave the matter open and to allow further presentations by
representatives of a discredited enterprise. One of those representativeDavid Irving, for example-might then complain that his academic
freedom is being infringed, but he would be making the mistake of
thinking that the freedom in question was a property of the individual
who must therefore be given opportunities to exercise it. No, say the
authors of the report, "It is ... not the absolute freedom of utterance of the
individual scholar, but the absolute freedom of thought, of inquiry, of
discussion, and of teaching, of the academic profession, that is asserted by
this declaration of principles." 46
Now it should be acknowledged that subsequent to 1915 other
conceptions of academic freedom have been put forward, conceptions
less guild oriented, less tied to the specific purposes of a certain kind of
work, more informed by the large philosophical questions--what is
freedom?, what is truth?, what is neutrality?, what is objectivity?--from
which I have been trying to wean you. And it is because these other
conceptions-some would call them more capacious; I would say that
they are too big for the task-have proven so persuasive both inside and
outside the academy that academic freedom becomes a problem for

4s Id. at 402.
- Id. at 404-405.
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those would combat Holocaust denial. My purpose here is to recall the
historical provenance of the term and to make it useful once again for
those who work in the academy as opposed to those who theorize about
it. I want to say to historians, be-historians, not epistemologists. (You're
no good at it anyway.) And I am not alone. I have already made
reference to the powerful piece by Judith Jarvis Thompson, and to her
argument I would add those of Louis Menand and Richard Rorty.
Menand begins by asking "What makes universities different from other
places in which people work?" and answers in a way that echoes the
formulations of the 1915 report:
The answer is that so far as the content of the work that
goes on in them is concerned, universities are selfregulating. The university professor is a professional.
He or she works in a business whose standards are, to
every extent possible, established and enforced by its
own practitioners.
Professions aspire to be selfregulating for the same reason that the Hollywood film
industry has its own rating system: because if a
profession doesn't undertake to regulate itself, it exposes
itself to the possibility of regulation by the state or some
47
other external agency.
Menand goes on to detail how comprehensive is the internal authority
wielded by those in possession of the right credentials. Tenured
academics "decide who is to be permitted to enter the profession" and
they "certify the legitimacy of scholarly work by requiring that it be
submitted to peer review and they create permanent members of the
profession by requiring junior professors to submit their work to senior
professors before awarding them tenure. . . .48"
The result is an
institution-the research university-that is "a virtual paradigm of
professionalism", one in which the "wide freedom of inquiry" typically
celebrated exists "only for the specialist."49 Always the goal is to protect
insiders from outside interference, and this extends to the interference of
one discipline with the business of another: "Academic freedom not
only protects sociology professors from the interference of trustees and
public officials...it protects them from physics professors as well" and
mandates "that decisions about what counts as good work in sociology

47 Louis Menand, The

Limits of Academic Freedom, in

(Louis Menand ed., 1996).
48Id. at 8.
49 Id.
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shall be made by sociologists." s Thus characterized, academic freedom
is not an abstract philosophical value with a pedigree in the writings of
Mill and other Enlightenment rationalists, but a form of guild
protectionism; which is exactly how Menand describes it in his summary
statement "Academic freedom is, at a basic level, an expression of self
5
interest: it is a freedom for academics." '
The detaching of academic freedom as a practice from the
philosophical or theoretical questions that might be put to it is the main
business of Richard's Rorty's essay, Does Academic Freedom Have
PhilosophicalPresuppositions?52 Rorty's answer, not surprisingly is "no",
which is also the answer he gives to the more "general question of
whether any social practice has philosophical, a well as empirical,
presuppositions."53 Empirical questions, Rorty explains, are questions
we can answer because with respect to any particular answer "we are
clear about what would falsify it"54; we can test for example whether a
particular illness has been caused by a bacteria or a virus. "But when it
comes to a philosophical belief like "[tihe truth of a sentence consists in
its correspondence to reality,' or '[e]thical judgments are claims to
knowledge, rather than mere expressions of feeling,' nobody... is sure
what counts for or against such propositions." 3
An even more
important difference between empirical and philosophical propositions,
says Rorty, is that a change in the status of the first kind will bring about
material changes in the practice it is a proposition about, while a change
in the status of the second kind will bring about changes only in the
world of theoretical debate. If medical science establishes (by the usual
tests and procedures) that a disease once thought to be caused by a virus
is in fact caused by something else, many things will be altered,
including conventional courses of treatment and the "disbursing of
funds for medical research." s 6 But if the majority of philosophers comes
to believe that the truth of a sentence is a matter of coherence rather than
correspondence the only thing that will alter will be the way
philosophers talk at certain moments in their professional conversations.
Everyone, including philosophers, will still employ and hear sentences
as they did before, using them to assert what are taken at the moment to

5 Id.at 17.
51Id.at 9.
52Richard Rorty, Does Academic Freedom Have Philosophical Presuppositions?, in THE FUTURE
OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 21, 22 (Louis Menand ed., 1996).
3

Id.

3' Id.
5 d.

561d.
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be true facts or to ask questions or to make promises or to provoke
irritation or to express joy or give commands or hand down verdicts, or
to perform the myriad of other actions catalogued in Speech Act Theory.
The lesson is generalizable: A difference in the philosophical account of
a practice (unless that practice is philosophy itself) does not dictate a
difference in the practice of the practice, although it might dictate a
change in the way you talked about the practice when you weren't
practicing it but talking about practicing it.
Rorty illustrates with the example of oath taking which at one
time, he points out, was thought by almost everyone to depend for its
force on a belief in a nonhuman authority to whom one would have
ultimately to answer for false swearing.5 ' No doubt some still believe
this about oath taking, but many more do not, yet the practice is engaged
in and engaged in seriously by believers and atheists alike. The reason is
that oath taking and swearing to tell the truth are components in a social
practice (of Anglo-American law) that has its own traditions, purposes,
consequences, and public functions; within that practice the meaning of
oath taking and of the penalties one risks by swearing falsely is perfectly
clear, and it is that (social/ institutional) meaning to which oath takers
are responsive independently of what they might say (if they would say
anything) if asked "what do you think ultimately underwrites oaths?"58
It is, or should be, the same, says Rorty, with the relationship
between the practices that are the empirical content of academic
freedom-self-governance, tolerance (within limits) of divergent views,
insulation from state dictates-and theories of academic freedom which
typically offer propositions about truth, representation, objectivity, and
the like:
[P]hilosophical debates about the nature of truth should
become as irrelevant to academic practices as debates
about the existence and forms of postmortem
punishment are to present-day judicial practices. Just as
we have much more confidence in our judicial system
than we do in any account of the afterlife, or the
workings of divine Providence, so we have, or at least
should have, much more confidence in our colleges and

5

7 ld. at 23.
5 Rorty, supra note 52, at 23.
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universities than we do in any philosophical view about
the nature of truth, or objectivity, or rationality.5 9

That confidence is, or should be, based on a track record of
performance that includes tried and true procedures, carefully
administered requirements for accreditation, widely accepted standards,
and publicly recognized achievements. A scholar who follows those
procedures, hews to those standards, and produces results validated by
her peers need not become defensive in response to a request for the
kind of philosophical justification it is neither her business nor her
obligation to provide:
When we say that good historians accurately represent
what they find in archives, we mean that they look hard
for relevant documents, do not discard documents
tending to discredit the historical thesis they are
propounding, do not misleadingly quote passages out of
context...and so on.
To assume that a historian
accurately represents the facts as she knows them is to
assume that she behaves in the way in which good,
honest historians behave. It is not to assume anything
about the reality of past events, or the truth- conditions
of statements about such events.., or about any other
philosophical topic60
If we put these statements together with those offered by Thompson and
Menand, and remember that mature practices carry with them their own
long established norms and protocols and need not submit themselves to
the interrogation of other, alien, practices, the challenge of Holocaust
denial will lose its force and be revealed not as an effort to correct history
but as an effort to hijack the historical enterprise under the guise of a
noble-sounding, but irrelevant, vocabulary. The proper response to
Holocaust deniers is to say that they have not met our criteria for being
considered seriously and that we are sending them away, without
apology and without any further justifications. And if they persist in
their work and seek to discredit the labors of honest men and women,
one must denounce them, ridicule them, harass them, and do in your
own way what Deborah Lipstadt has done to David Irving-make the
bastards pay.

59 Id. at 24.
6 Id. at 30-31 (citation omitted).
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